Reflecting on the Science in Science Communication by Bronson, Kelly
Canadian Journal of Communication Vol 39 (2014) 523–537
©2014 Canadian Journal of Communication Corporation
Kelly Bronson is Acting Director of the Science and Technology Studies Program at St. Thomas
University. McCain Hall 302, P.O. Box 4569, Fredericton, NB E3B 5G3. Email: kbronson@stu.ca .
Reflecting on the Science in Science Communication 
Kelly Bronson
St. Thomas University
ABSTRACT Science communication is often understood as the transmission of facts to igno-
rant audiences. Science and Technology Studies allows a different perspective on science—as
open to negotiation with other knowledges and institutions—and therefore a different per-
spective on its communication. Within an STS perspective, what counts as scientiﬁc fact or
legitimate expertise takes shape within communicative acts. This article demonstrates the
analytical purchase given by taking such an approach to science communication by applying
it to a case analysis of biotechnology resistance on the Canadian Prairie.
KEYWORDS  Science communication; Discourse analysis; Constructivism; Biotechnology;
Controversy
RÉSUMÉ La communication scientiﬁque est souvent comprise comme la transmission de
faits à un public ignorant. Etudes des science et technologies (STS) nous proposent une
perspective différente sur la science—comme un ensemble de contenus ouverts à la
négociation avec d’autres savoirs et institutions—et donc une perspective décalée en termes
de  communication. Dans une perspective STS, ce qui est considéré comme un fait
scientiﬁque ou une expertise légitime prend forme dans des actes de communication. Cet
article démontre la pertinence de ce type d’analyse pour appréhender la communication
scientiﬁque en l’appliquant à une étude de cas portant sur  la résistance  face
aux biotechnologies dans la Prairie canadienne.
MOTS CLÉS  Communication scientiﬁque; Analyse de discours; Constructivisme; Biotechnologie;
Controverse
Introduction 
The dominant approach to science communication assumes that science constitutes
secure measurable knowledge that an unknowledgeable public lacks and needs.
Historically, science communication campaigns have therefore aimed at educating the
public about science and its benefits (Brossard & Lewenstein, 2010). Although public
education approaches still dominate, they have long been subject to criticism for failing
to account for rich public knowledge (for example, see Wynne, 1992) and for failing to
bring publics on board with emergent technologies (for example, see Einseidel, 2008).
Decades of education and advocacy around biotechnology, for instance, have yet to
secure it as entirely unproblematic for all publics (Jasanoff, 2003; Eichelbaum, Allan,
Fleming & Anderson, 2001).
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Western Canadian grain farmers’ resistance to biotechnologies became visible on
the Canadian Prairie in 1998, when Percy Schmeiser received notice that Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready™ canola was discovered growing on his property. For Monsanto, this
constituted an infringement of its intellectual property. He had not signed the requisite
contract nor paid to use their seeds. To Schmeiser, the presence of this canola was pol-
lution contaminating his fields. He found crop biotechnologies expensive, and had de-
veloped his own methods and tools for successfully farming without relying on
biotechnologies. At the time, this placed him among roughly one-quarter of all
Saskatchewan farmers (Statistics Canada, 2006). Unlike the hundreds of farmers who
every year settle out of court over out of place biotechnology (see Center for Food
Safety, 2005), Schmeiser countersued, insisting that he had not intentionally planted
Monsanto’s seed technologies nor benefitted from their presence on his land. The con-
flict between Schmeiser and Monsanto moved through the Canadian court system,
ending in a five-four majority Supreme Court ruling against Schmeiser in 2004.
In this article, I focus on the countersuit between Schmeiser v.Monsanto to examine
how science communication through the Canadian court system may be legitimating
particular kinds of knowledge and servicing particular interests at the exclusion of oth-
ers. I argue that using a Science and Technology Studies (STS) perspective as a basis for
interrogating science communication focuses attention on how science is constructed—
not just communicated as an a priori set of facts—in acts of science communication.
An STS approach is useful in revealing that the farmers mobilized into lawsuits
against Monsanto (including Schmeiser) are primarily concerned with the social and
political context of scientific facts used in biotechnology regulation, rather than the
science per se. An STS approach also helps illuminate the ways in which legal actors’
representations of science have re-stabilized the normative boundary separating sci-
ence from non-science within the Canadian regulatory context. 
An STS perspective on science communication
Jane Gregory and Simon Jay Lock (2008) suggest that by the end of the twentieth cen-
tury a “new mood” was struck in the developed world’s science-society relationship,
such that scientific institutions were acutely aware of the need for public support for
science. In 1985, the Royal Society of London published a report titled The Public
Understanding of Science (known as the Bodmer Report, after its author Lord Bodmer),
which was commissioned with the belief that general interest in, and support for, sci-
ence could be enhanced if scientists communicated the benefits of science to the wider
public. In typical historical accounts, the Bodmer report marks the beginning of the
Public Understanding of Science (PUS) field that is characterized by vigorous efforts,
in academic and policy circles, to use science education to instill confidence and sup-
port for the scientific enterprise among members of the public (Turner, 2008). Many
of these educational and academic initiatives are published the official PUS journal,
Public Understanding of Science (since 1992).
PUS approaches are informed by a deficit model of science communication within
which publics are assumed to be deficient in technical matters relating to sciences and
technologies. The deficit model is supported by normative ideologies that view science
as a value neutral body of knowledge called scientific fact, to be transferred (Gregory
& Lock, 2008) from experts to an ignorant public (often via mediators like policymak-
ers and science journalists). Hence, only they possess the requisite expertise to guide
scientific agenda-setting and policymaking. Brian Wynne (2007) labels this view “sci-
entism” (see also Sarewitz, 2004). The operation of a deficit model of science commu-
nication is confirmed by a host of empirical studies that reveal scientists and
policymakers conceptualize publics as “emotional and ignorant” (Cook, 2004, p. 38)
and their opposition to technologies as a product of ignorance (see Collins & Evans,
2002; Cook & Robbins, 2002; Gregory & Miller, 1998; Priest, 2001).
In the 1990s, social science surveys of public knowledge of science were conducted
in the U.K. to give purchase to the deficit model of science communication (Gregory
& Lock, 2008). The most publicized of these efforts was conducted in 1989 by John
Durant and colleagues, who later published their findings in Nature (see Durant, Evans,
& Thomas, 1989). Such quantitative surveying of public knowledge has since been
heavily criticized—including by John Durant himself (see Durant, 1999, as well as
Evans & Durant, 1995)—for failing to show a definitive link between knowledge about
and attitudes toward science (for example, see Lambert & Rose, 1996). The findings
of these surveys also imply that decades of public education in science has failed to
enhance the general literacy of publics or brought them on board with emerging sci-
entific practices and technologies (Einsiedel, 2008).
Scientism also appears to inform the dominant approaches to science in the law.
Just as “the conventional framing of public understanding of science misleadingly reifies
scientific knowledge, as if it were objective and context-free” (Wynne, 1992, p. 282), em-
pirical research shows that many judges and lawyers conceptualize science as purified
from culture (Romanucci-Ross & Tancredi, 2007). The law’s definition of science is
fairly uncluttered: “[t]he process by which knowledge is systematized or classified
through the use of observation, experimentation, or reasoning” (Feldman, 2009, p. 98).
Science and Technology Studies (STS) advances an approach for conceptualizing
science in which scientific knowledge may be characterized as being constructed:
scientific knowledge is made rather than found (by “discovering” nature
and simply gathering facts). Above all, this making involves a social
process: science is human handiwork. This is not to suggest that it is only
a social process … scientific knowledge relates to nature as a map relates
to the real world. … Although various maps of the same part of the world
can be equally valid, … not just any map is possible. (Bijker, Bal, &
Hendriks, 2009, p. 29)
This “contextual foundation” (Bijker et al., 2009, p. 24; Collins & Pinch, 1993;
Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1992) means that STS scholars do not make an a prioridistinction
between (objective) scientific knowledge and other (subjective) knowledges. Within
an STS perspective, science is not a neatly bounded entity but something that takes
shape through communication processes, by various actors including non-scientists
(e.g., activists, farmers, lawyers, policymakers, regulators) who participate in drawing
boundaries around what comes to count as properly scientific (e.g., Jasanoff, 1995).
Put simply, science takes shape in negotiation with other institutions and forms of
knowledge.1
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Applying this view to the courts suggests that these institutions go beyond setting
the normative standards for what people are permitted to do with technologies. It also
positions legal discourses as political representations that effect changes in material
practices, self-conceptions and everyday lives (Jasanoff, 1995). Calling a seed “intellec-
tual property” protects the interests of its supposed “creators” via a stringent legal
regime that directly conflicts with historical practices of seed-saving, and black-boxes
(Latour, 1987), or makes invisible the historical contributions of farmers to seed science.
Other research about the lawsuit being analyzed here tends to detail the normative
standard-setting of the law (e.g., telling farmers what they are permitted to do with
the patented seeds) (c.f. Bernhardt, 2005; de Beer, 2005; Garforth & Ainslie, 2006;
Kershen, 2002; Muller, 2006; Sudduth, 2001; Ziff, 2005), while overlooking the social,
political and economic sources of power derived from the authoritative distinctions
made around science and technology in the courts.
To claim that conceptions of science are often fluid prior to being dealt with in
court processes does not negate the existence of long-standing cultural conceptions
of science. Those instances in which cases involving science and technology do arrive
before the courts, however, represent potentially destabilizing moments in long-stand-
ing and dominant conceptions of science and technology. 
Methodology
There were two phases in this study of biotechnology controversy on the Canadian
Prairie. The first consisted of an ethnographic exploration of Western Canadian farmers
organized into legal action against Monsanto. The second involved a textual analysis
of decision law in Schmeiser v. Monsanto. In 2002, I moved to Saskatchewan to study
a particular group of farmers resisting agricultural biotechnologies in the legal arena.
Working against the notion that public opposition to science is caused by ignorance,
my goal was to give voice to an oppositional public’s descriptions of biotechnologies
and to detail the culture of farming in an era of high technologies (see Bronson, 2009).
The method chosen to study this farming culture was a critical ethnography, or a po-
litically motivated cultural description that uses qualitative analysis to interpret mean-
ings from these descriptions (Morse & Richards, 2002).
Observational data about Saskatchewan farming that was organized in and
around legal action against Monsanto was conducted throughout 2002–2004. The
ethnographic data were gathered with the help of a camera, tape-recorder, and pen
and paper, and was built over many hours spent in farmer’s fields, at farmhouses, at
protests, and at a number of local “coffee row,” among other cultural sites. Most of the
participant farmers in the sample followed organic farming methods and all avoided
crop biotechnologies. This placed them, at the time, in a minority farming group
(Statistics Canada, 2006). Twenty open-ended key informant interviews also were con-
ducted. Reflecting the demographic distribution of the farming community in
Saskatchewan, more than half of the participants were male.
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was used to examine how science was commu-
nicated in legal texts from Schmeiser.2 Situated within a constructivist theoretical frame-
work, CDA transcends transmission models of communication (Shannon & Weaver,
1949), viewing discourse as helping to shape material realities. It is overtly political,
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and using this method within the current context meant attending to representations
of science in legal texts with an eye to how interests are actually produced (or repro-
duced) through the text (van Dijk, 1998).
From an STS framework, and using CDA, the way in which science and technology
are communicated in the courts is understood as political representations that shape
ways of thinking (Foucault, 1977; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In other words, the mech-
anisms of science communication—and in particular the authoritative acts of science
communication emanating from the courts—are seen as helping to shape and/or so-
lidify conceptions of science and technology, as well as contributing to particular rela-
tionships of power around them. As Lawrence Grossberg (1987) puts it, texts set “the
conditions of possibility that enable a particular practice or statement to exist in a spe-
cific social context and that enable people to live their lives in different ways” (p. 88).
Sheila Jasanoff (1995) echoes this view, emphasizing the need for analyses of science
in the law to pay attention to the “informal practices and techniques by which courts
certify the facticity of some claims and deny the validity of others” (p. 44), instead of
simply focusing on the formal legal rules (like the U.S. Daubert standard) in deciding
what constitutes reliable scientific knowledge.
Contextual public engagements with biotechnology
By the time of the first Canadian release of crop biotechnologies in 1996, many
Canadian farmers were well aware that exclusion from seeds is vital to the maintenance
of corporate and political dominance over their lives. Smaller seed companies and seed
science had been privatized with palpable effects on farmers (Kloppenburg, 1988;
Kneen, 1995). Adding to farmer unease about seed contracts is the evidence that crop
biotechnologies reseed themselves without intervention (Gepts, 2005), thereby mak-
ing farmers vulnerable to infringement lawsuits.
The deficit model of science communication is not very helpful in making sense
of the current biotechnology controversy in Western Canada because farmers’ concerns
do not fit within the epistemic space that this model affords. Regulatory assessments
often do not include consideration of the community or societal health implications
of biotechnologies. As can be seen from a 1996 government of Canada report about
public confidence in biotechnology, regulators describe risk as a technical problem for
the laboratory rather than thinking about what is not yet known, about possible un-
desirable outcomes from technologies:
The trigger we use to review a new product for its safety to human health
and to the environment is not dependent upon the process [the tech-
niques of gene transfer] that is used to develop it. It is dependent upon
the risk the particular product poses … if it poses a potential risk we are
going to review it. (Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable
Development, 1996)
The farmers in my sample did not lack scientific understandings, but, unlike the
regulators, they described crop biotechnologies within the context of a wide range of
social, political and cultural implications. They described, in detail, the limitations of
the current working conception of risk within biotechnology regulation: a reductionist
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framing of biotechnological risk such that the laboratory process of inserting novel
genes into organisms is incapable of creating yet unknown (or even unknowable)
qualities in them (see also Kinchy, 2012). These individuals argued for consideration
of an ecological model of risk, and were especially concerned about the ways in which
community relationships change under corporate seed contracts, which grant farmers
limited access to crop biotechnologies and prevent them, by law, from saving the seeds
for use in subsequent years (Magnan, 2004, p. 306).
The participating farmers expressed concern over the limitations of the facts being
used in regulatory decision-making, as well as the context in which regulatory “facts”
are derived (corporate, not public, laboratories). They also outlined concern about the
assumption that high technologies are the engine of individual farm as well as national
wellbeing that seemingly drives government seed research funding. As one farmer re-
ported, the problem is not gene transfer, but the domination of a crop biotechnology
“value system” over the agricultural research and regulatory agenda at the expense of
alternative ways of organizing life. She elaborated:
Biotechnology is a different value system. The whole value around clean
fields, monocultures, maximizing production, not a weed in sight … the
thousand apples all looking exactly the same way … it’s part of a general
cultural bias which permeates the whole agricultural system from research
to implementation towards privatizing, standardizing and industrializing
everything. 
At the root of this public’s resistance to crop biotechnologies and their legal mobi-
lization against Monsanto was frustration with the lack of openness in biotechnological
governance. They lamented the lack of public deliberation in policymaking processes,
and the lack of transparency to the political and corporate context framing the science
used in biotechnology policymaking. The farmers claimed that a lack of public deliber-
ation about regulatory decisions, including decisions about the choice of scientific frame-
works, was rendering invisible the fact that value-based decisions are being taken by
people in particular social and political contexts.
Faced with a political system seemingly deaf to these kinds of concerns—a system
that conflates these concerns with technical ignorance—Western Canadian grain farm-
ers decided to bring their contestation into the legal arena. To this end, during the
Schmeiser v.Monsanto proceedings, two Saskatchewan-based organic farmers—Larry
Hoffman and Dale Beaudoin—filed for class status, Hoffman et al. v Monsanto in an at-
tempt to pursue Monsanto in court on behalf of all of the province’s organic grain
farmers. They claimed that Monsanto’s biotechnology canola had extensively “conta-
minated” non-biotechnology (notably, organic) crops but also, in the words of one
farmer: 
Despite years of lobbying efforts to get a full public hearing on the issue of
GE [wheat] to date there has been no action, nothing. Nobody is listening
to us and we hope the [Hoffman] lawsuit can do something to change this.
Qualitative studies of Canadian biotechnology regulators’ perceptions confirm
their anxiety about the “irrational fears” of publics who supposedly are motivated
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more by passion than rational and knowledge-based assessments of technology (see
Shields & Sanders, 2006). Regulators, informed by deficit model assumptions, appear
to only account for those biotechnology publics who celebrate biotechnologies
(Montpetit & Rouillard, 2008; Shields, 2008).
The evidence presented above suggests that the concerns of Western Canadian
grain farmers have little to do with the science of biotechnology per se. Rather, their
concerns centre upon the social and political context of the science (i.e., the constitu-
tion of facts used in regulation). A central insight from Science and Technology Studies
(STS) is that the harms and benefits arising from science have much to do with the
particular socio-political and cultural contexts within which scientific knowledge is
pursued and obtained. Within a narrowly understood scientific risk-management cul-
ture, the exclusion of such critiques coming from “non-expert” social groups like
Western Canadian grain farmers in policy processes is not unexpected (Montpetit &
Rouillard, 2008).
Taking an STS approach to examining Western grain Canadian farmers’ critical
engagements with biotechnology situates their legal action as a form of communicative
action (see also Kinchy, 2012). These farmers decided to use the courts to help com-
municate their contextually based scientific assessments of biotechnologies in a man-
ner that can be understood as politically valid knowledge within a regulatory context
conditioned by deficit model assumptions.
One farmer described the use of the courts as a tool for widening the discourse
about biotechnologies, saying, “[o]ur class action lawsuit [Hoffman] here is just a part
of a growing movement that combines all sorts of related issues, social, political, eco-
nomic …” The majority of farmers interviewed talked about Hoffman as a potential
means of opening biotechnological decision-making to a public engagement process.3
In other words, with the Hoffman lawsuit they hoped to challenge the technocratic
arena for biotechnological knowledge and governance by ultimately putting decision-
making bodies and processes on trial. When the farmers filed their Statement of Claim
in 2002, they asked for a declaration of genetic engineering as a “development” within
the meaning of the Environmental Assessment Act (EAA):
a successful declaration that the testing and development of GMOs was a
‘development’ within the meaning of the EA would operate to modify be-
havior because the Defendants can be enjoined if they should attempt to
introduce future GM crops without ministerial approval. This would com-
pel the Defendants to submit their engineered gene to a public environ-
mental scrutiny rather than the behind closed doors approach they have
been allowed to use with the federal government’s regulatory bodies.
(SKCA, Memorandum, 2003, para. 17)
The critical discourse analysis of a sample of the legal texts from Schmeiser focused
on the ways in which science and scientific credibility were discursively distinguished
from non-science and unreliable knowledge in the trials. To this end, the textual analy-
sis was guided by a number of analytical questions: How are science and technology
articulated by the legal actors in the case? What is the courts’ designation of expertise
as they define certain people and topics as relevant, and others not? What is the
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process by which the public concerns over biotechnologies are translated into the legal
context? What is the degree to which the courts’ imagining(s) of biotechnology shows
openness to science and technology as social processes? Might the rhetorical space
created through the legal discourse and procedure either constrain or enable the ability
of the affected public to collectively control the development of biotechnology? What
is the relationship between this lawsuit and its relevant legal and political and social
history? What institutional features in the law, of regulatory culture or of politics may
correlate with these textual processes and logics?
In Schmeiser the boundaries around science (Gieryn, 1983; 1999) and expertise
(Wynne, 1992) were established such that they re-stabilized the dominant conception
of science held by regulatory actors. The Canadian courts constrained farmer practices,
notably, seed-saving, through their application of the Canadian Patent Act 1985, and
bolstered deficit model assumptions about publics as non-expert by discursively re-
affirming farmers as irrelevant to biotechnology governance.
Within the documents he submitted to the courts and in his direct testimony,
Percy Schmeiser attempted to establish himself as a scientific expert. In his original
Factum to the Trial Court he writes: “After growing canola over many years, Mr.
Schmeiser has developed his own farming practices particular to the land that he farms,
which practices have withstood experimentation and the test of time” (2001, para. 14,
emphasis added by author). “All in all,” he writes in his Factum, “Mr. Schmeiser’s
farming practices have proved to be effective. His canola seed, and the crops grown
from it, are a source of great personal pride and accomplishment. He is, by all stan-
dards, a successful canola farmer” (2001, para.14, emphasis added by author).
Schmeiser’s conception of expertise expands beyond the deficit model to incorporate
tacit knowledge belonging to the subject matter of particular domains of knowledge
or a particular knowledge environment, rather than a kind of universal knowledge
(Merton, 1973).
The Trial Court judge’s descriptions of the testimonial evidence in Schmeiser ex-
plicitly constructed a distinction between farm-level experimentation and laboratory-
based expertise, thereby evoking a particularly narrow notion of scientific knowledge.
The court ruling in this particular case was informed by the percentage of Roundup
Ready™ crop thought to be growing in Schmeiser’s fields, with the measurement hav-
ing been derived from “grow-out”4 and genetic testing of seed samples taken from his
property. Both Schmeiser (via Dr. Lyle Friesen at the University of Manitoba) and
Monsanto performed grow-out tests but their respective findings differed.4 The judge
used the following language in comparing the conflicting results of the grow-out tests: 
Numerous samples were taken … A series of independent testsby different
experts confirmed that the canola Mr. Schmesier planted and grew in 1998
was 95-98 percent Roundup™ resistant. Only a grow-out test by Mr.
Schmesier in his yard in 1999 and by Mr. Freisen on samples supplied by
Mr. Schmeiser did not support this result. (2004, SCR, para. 64, emphasis
added by author)
In labelling Monsanto’s tests as “independent” and its scientists as “experts,” the
judge drew on and affirmed the dominant cultural conception of scientific knowledge
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as decontextualized, operating outside of the influence of social or political values.
This renders Percy Schmeiser a partial experimenter who is invested in the testing
done in his “yard.” That the judge uses the latter term reinforces the notion of
Schmeiser as parochial and folksy—qualities that are anathema to the idealized scien-
tist. Put simply, the language of the court places Schmeiser on the wrong side of the
credibility line denoting whether knowledge claims earn the imprimatur of science.
In his ruling the Trial Court judge also states that, “only three tests conducted by
Schmeiser contravene the grow-out evidence supplied by Monsanto,” “more signiﬁcant
are the results of genetic testing by staff of Monsanto US at St. Louis” (2001, FCT, para.
48, emphasis added by author). This deference to laboratory-based practice is some-
what puzzling given that the agricultural practice in question—commercial growing
of canola—takes place in fields, not laboratories. As further evidence of the primacy
given to laboratory-based science, in the Facts used to inform the Appeal Court deci-
sion, Canola is described as “a valuable innovation developed for farmers … mainly
by Canadian scientists” (2004, SCC, para. 8, emphasis added by author) even though
histories of Canadian seed science (Kneen, 1992) show the vital involvement of farmers.
In fact, early plant breeding in Canada was a clear instantiation of the production and
acceptance of scientific knowledge (and its products) as a process of collective inno-
vation involving local knowledge and flowing in and out of experimental and social
settings.  In their submission to the Supreme Court on behalf of Schmeiser, the inter-
veners flagged this preference for laboratory-based science over farmer knowledge and
practice as “unwarranted … in light of the absence of evidence that the investments
of plant breeders using traditional breeding techniques are less substantial than those
of companies relying upon biotechnology to invent new varieties of plants” (Council
of Canadians, 2003, p. 5).
In addition to the grow-out test results, the courts drew upon the testimony of
various actors in establishing how Schmeiser’s fields came to be populated in accor-
dance with the grow-out test results. Schmeiser’s defense included testimonial and
material evidence attempting to demonstrate that he did not knowingly acquire (i.e.,
purchase) nor segregate Roundup Ready™ seeds for future use. His testimony also
sought to establish that any population of his fields in 1998 (the time of sampling and
Monsanto’s intervention) was the result of, in his words, unwitting “contamination
of Mr. Schmeiser’s seed supply” (1998, Defendant’s Factum, para. 10). In support of
this assertion he presented photographs (as well as testimony as to their accuracy) de-
tailing how he had made use of seeds on his land, and areas of perceived Roundup
Ready™ contamination close to the roads and adjacent to the power poles. Schmeiser
also provided the testimony of his co-worker, Carlyl Moritz, who claimed to have wit-
nessed Roundup Ready™ contamination in action in the form of “wind-blown swaths”
(or plowing debris) coming from a neighbour’s farm. At the Supreme Court, a neigh-
bouring farmer, Elmer Borstmeyer, a licensed Roundup Ready™ canola grower, testi-
fied that in 1996 he had driven his grain truck by four of Schmeiser’s canola fields and
on two of his trips a loose tarp on his truck caused him to scatter canola seed. “The
tarp acted like a cyclone,” he recalled. “I lost some seed. That’s for sure” (2003,
Appellant’s Factum, para. 105).
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Monsanto presented evidence and testimony from two-dozen witnesses, key
among them Barry Hertz, a mechanical engineer it had hired because of his expertise
in road vehicle aerodynamics. Hertz told the court that, according to his calculations,
canola seed blown off of the top of a moving grain truck would fly no more than 8.8
metres from the road. He based his mathematical simulation on weather conditions
recorded at the Saskatoon airport in October and May of 1996, 100 kilometers from
Schmeiser’s farm. From his testimony the courts were encouraged to infer that seed
blown off of the top of passing grain trucks could not be responsible for the Roundup
Ready™ canola plants that Schmeiser found growing on his land 100 feet from the
road. Another key witness for Monsanto was Dr. Keith Downey, a canola plant breeder
involved in the early seed-breeding programs. His expert opinion on typical canola
breeding behaviour (i.e., the likelihood of its pollen outcrossing with Monsanto’s seed)
was used to controvert Schmeiser’s accounts of contamination (Trans. CE R Downey,
1998 esp. 716–717).
Upon considering testimonial evidence, the trial judge rejected the possibility that
the Roundup Ready™ plants on Schmeiser’s property were the result of seed inadvertently
blown or carried onto his land (2001, FCT, para. 188). The judge’s wording is revealing:
It may be that some Roundup Ready seed was carried to Mr. Schmeiser’s
field without his knowledge. Some such seed might have survived the win-
ter to germinate in the spring of 1998. However, I am persuaded by evidence
of Dr. Keith Downey … that none of the suggested sources could reason-
ably explain the concentration or extent of Roundup Ready™ canola of a
commercial quality evident form the results of tests on Schmeiser’s crop.
(2001, FCT, para. 65, emphasis added by author)
Again the court draws upon and affirms the dominant conception of science, pars-
ing farmer testimony as mere opinion, while Monsanto witness testimony is treated as
expert evidence (these rhetorical acts are rehearsed elsewhere, [2004, SCR, para 65, 66;
2001, SKQB, para. 19]). For the legal actors in Schmeiser, scientific truth is borne out by
the formalized and technically mediated procedures of laboratory-based practice.
Articulations of science expressed by the courts in Schmeiser suggest that tacit
knowledge and the senses, unmediated by genetic technique and laboratory equip-
ment, are unreliable and unscientific. This certainly appears to the be the case for farm-
ers, who depend on a kind of situated/contextualized knowledge—what they see, feel,
hear or smell in a complex environmental system—for information about seeds. By
extension, oppositional publics who are not likely to be laboratory scientists are
deemed as not having the requisite knowledge to weigh up the potential impacts of
seed technologies. The resounding message is that the public can and should trust the
experts. The legal actors in Schmeiser, therefore, re-stabilized the conception of science
that had been circulating in regulatory culture. 
Conclusion 
Dominant approaches to science communication treat science as a fixed set of value-
neutral facts to be transmitted to a technically ignorant public. In Schmeiser v. Monsanto,
the courts discursively constructed clear boundaries separating laboratory-based sci-
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entific expertise from other knowledge, thus affirming regulatory assumptions about
what constitutes valid regulatory knowledge, and justifying the continued exclusion
of publics from biotechnology decision-making.
The findings of this study align with other empirical research, showing that judges
and lawyers tend to hold an idealized and narrow conception of science (Feldman,
2009; Romanucci-Ross & Tancredi, 2007). In a Science and Technology Studies (STS)
framework, science is perceived as something that achieves stability through processes
that include struggles over the control and distribution of meanings (Latour, 1987).
Language is central to this process. Using a constructivist perspective of science com-
munication to analyze Schmeiser has helped to illustrate the role of legal discourse in
stabilizing a normative conception of science that corresponds to an image of science’s
publics as lacking knowledge. In so doing, we observe the pitfalls of viewing science
as value-neutral and truth-producing.
The analysis reveals an opportunity lost. Lawsuits like Schmeiser present moments
of destabilization in the conception of legitimate knowledge to be used in biotechnol-
ogy decision-making. The Canadian courts, however, were not prepared to concede
the possibility of scientific knowledge based on a farmer’s experience of his seed-saving
practices or of his particular land. Although Schmeiser provides an invitation for re-ap-
praising of the notion of a biotechnological fact as un-ecological, for the legal actors in
this case, scientific truth is born from laboratory-based techniques and laboratory sci-
entists who are experts, not farmers. In stabilizing “scientistic” conceptions of science,
the courts thus confirm the assumption of biotechnology’s decision-makers that un-
derstandings of phenomena derived outside the laboratory have no place alongside
expert claims to superior knowledge.
Justification and justice are cognate concepts foregrounded in Schmeiser, wherein
struggles over definitions of scientific fact are at once struggles over the authority of
particular forms of knowledge. In this context, the key question is: Whose knowledge
ought to count as valid in setting the research agenda or informing regulatory decisions?
Expert knowledge constructed as it is in Schmeiser cements the perceived exclusivity
of biotechnology’s political and scientific culture, thereby solidifying the current
biotechnological order that excludes outsider publics.
Political opposition to crop biotechnologies among Canadian farmers persists,
bringing enormous pressure to bear on scientists, industry and policymakers. In
2004, Monsanto was forced to shelve its Roundup Ready™ wheat due to public pres-
sure from collective farmer and farm organizations, and the Canadian Wheat Board.
The seeming invisibility of public discourses and publics within processes of biotech-
nological governance is problematic for democratic science policy because it is pre-
cisely within governance discourses that expectations around technologies are
defined and the parameters of power vis-à-vis our collective technological futures is
set (Kitcher, 2001).
A Science and Technology Studies (STS) perspective can help us move beyond
problematizations of the public as illogical and irrelevant to reveal the power of these
representations, and those of science in shaping the wider social and cultural life of
technologies. Regulatory assumptions rooted in the deficit model of science commu-
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nication lurk behind unproductive relations between science and its publics. Western
Canada’s biotechnology-resistant farmers are presumably like other members of the
public in their complex and situated assessments of the sciences and technological
products, and with their awareness and concern about the contexts within which sci-
ence and technological products are constituted. These are engagements with tech-
nology that we, as communication researchers and practitioners, miss if we ourselves
are not open to the negotiated nature of scientific knowledge production and the non-
neutral nature of scientific texts.
Notes
I am not advocating a strong constructivist position even though these positions do exist within the1.
STS cannon (Bloor, 2007). Words do not make realities. They are material-discursive (Barad, 2007). Social
processes like communicative acts stabilize what comes to count as legitimate scientific knowledge,
thereby producing meanings that empower some possibilities to act, while disempowering others.
Legal scholars presaged this use of the law (as a tool for regulatory reform) when they pointed out2.
years ago that Canada’s lack of novel regulatory structure for biotechnologies makes them vulnerable
to litigation (Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, 1999; de Beer, personal conversation,
2009).
This is a method for testing plants for the presence of chemical resistance by growing out seeds into3.
plants in a controlled environment and spraying those seeds with particular chemicals. The surviving
plants are deemed resistant. 
Schmeiser took his own samples, detailing a careful methodology, and he grew these in his field4.
under the conditions any in vitu grow-out would hope to replicate. He then sent his seed samples,
which he testified to carefully handling, to Dr. Friesan. Schmeiser’s grow-out tests revealed from 0 to
68 percent presence of Roundup Ready™ canola, whereas Monsanto’s tests found up to 98 percent
contamination.
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